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ABSTRACT
It may be advantageous to provide a variety of kinds of patent protection to heterogenous
innovations. Innovations which benefit society largely through their use as building blocks to future
inventions may require a different scope of protection in order to be encouraged. We model the
problem of designing an optimal patent menu (scope and length) when the fertility of an innovation
in generating more innovations cannot be observed. The menu of patent scope can be implemented
with mandated buyout fees. Evidence of heterogeneous fertility and patent obsolescence, keys to the
model, are presented using patent data from the US.
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Patent policy is the centerpiece of many nations’ attempts to encourage innova-
tion. Since innovation is thought to be central to both macroeconomic perfor-
mance and the microeconomic structure of industry, the study of patent policy is
a central topic in policy discussions of the economics of innovation and growth.
Patents are the granting of a property right to an inventor. In the language of
modern economic theory, an inventor is given the right to exclude others from
producing over a part of the product space. One element of the protection is the
length of time for which the protection lasts. Another is the set of products which,
at any given time, may be prevented by the patent holder. Patent protection is
costly because it generates market power for the innovator; it is necessary because
inventions are costly to produce but may be nonrivalrous (costless to reproduce)
after their invention, leading the inventor without a means of beneﬁting without
some protection.
Innovations can have many beneﬁts. One is that they may be useful in them-
selves (or together with existing knowledge) in producing something directly. Also,
innovations are building blocks to future innovations, and some may provide more
“fertile” subsequent research than others. Both characteristics are valuable, but
they might require quite diﬀerent sorts of patent protection. Patents reward in-
novators through monopoly proﬁts; very fertile innovations may have a hard time
capitalizing on this right if it is deﬁned narrowly so that subsequent projects erode
the original innovator’s market power too readily. Speciﬁcally, for a given level of
protection, proﬁts may be decreasing in the usefulness of the invention to future
innovators. Broad protection, in the sense of protecting against a wide variety
of subsequent innovations, may be required to encourage such innovations. On
the other hand, protection against subsequent innovations clearly discourages fu-
ture projects, and thus deters innovation. Finding the correct balance depends,
then, may depend on details of the invention, details that may be hard for the
patent authority to ascertain. We investigate the potential for patent policy to
provide diﬀerent protection for diﬀerent patents, considering the fact that it may
be impossible for the patent authority to observe the diﬀerences in fertility ex-ante
when the patent is issued. The patent describes the set of products protected in a
given period (Breadth) and the length of time of the protection, and the patentee
chooses a breadth/length combination from a patent “menu” when the patent
application is ﬁled.
The literature on optimal patent design has focused on at least two areas that
2are directly relevant to this work. Several papers have studied the problem as
one of providing some breadth of protection for some length of time. Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990) study a reduced form design problem where the patent authority
seeks to provide an inventor with a ﬁxed amount of monopoly proﬁts to exactly
oﬀset the costs of research. A more structural model is the one in O’Dognohue et
al. (1997). Innovations arrive along a quality ladder, and breadth of protection is
deﬁned in terms of what kinds of future projects are within the scope of the original
patent. They ﬁnd that, in a world where improvements arise more frequently, the
socially optimal amount of patent breadth should be greater than if there is less
potential for future projects. The question asked here is how patent policy can
be made to do this when fertility of innovations is unobserved.
Other papers have tackled some problems of patent policy in the face of incom-
plete information on the part of the patent oﬃce. In those papers, the focus has
been on sorting products by their usefulness by trading oﬀ the length of the patent
against a fee. In fact, since both US and European patents are now based on a
renewal-fee system, such a menu of lengths and fees is already in place, albeit
at seemingly low fees. Cornelli and Schankerman (1997) and Scotchmer(1997)
show, however, that in a world where patent characteristics are unobserved to
the patent oﬃce, it can be optimal to sort diﬀerent types of innovations into dif-
ferent types of patents. The diﬀerent types of patents they focus on are patents
of diﬀerent lengths; the diﬀerence in this paper is that both the length and the
breadth of the patent are used as instruments. This is consistent with worksuch
as Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) who consider the use of both
as instruments.
For the most part, we workwith a sequential “quality ladder” model similar
to the one in O’Dognohue et al. (1997). Our model has several key ingredi-
ents. A ﬁrst innovator has an invention of given value and unobserved degree of
“spillovers” to future projects. The spillovers take the form of the speed with
which improvements to the product can be made. Higher arrival of improvements
is a beneﬁt to society, but is a deterrent to patentees who ﬁnd that their invention
is more rapidly made obsolete by the improvement and eliminate their monopoly
proﬁts. The fact that patents encourage investment through sales of the patented
item means that fertile research areas, which lead to rapid improvements, are least
proﬁtable for the original inventor. The patent authority, then, needs to provide
specialized incentives to patentee in fertile research areas. This takes the form of
broader patents. However, broad patents may be inappropriate in slower-growth
areas; the patent oﬃce can, however, oﬀer several varieties of patent protection in
3such a way as to induce innovators to choose the protection best suited to society.
Given that current patent law does not explicitly allow for multiple widths,
inventors may seekways to acquire extra breadth when they need it. One com-
monly discussed practice is the patent wall. An inventor discovers a particularly
useful innovation, which is likely to be made obsolete rapidly. Before going to the
patent oﬃce, the researcher engages in socially wasteful spending in order to gen-
erate several other nearly duplicate inventions. Patenting a variety of inventions
in order to build this wall is supposed to be a way of acquiring breadth, since
a subsequent innovation will only be a competitor if it infringes on none of the
many patents in the wall. Potential infringers can respond by spending resources
making their improvement appear to be non-infringing (“designing around”).
A model of optimal patent walls is formulated as an extension to the sequential
model introduced in section 4. More proﬁtable innovations and innovations more
prone to obsolescence attract walls. Since walls and designing around is wasteful,
oﬀering broader patents to the innovators who would waste eﬀort building walls
can be another desirable feature of a multiple-breadth patent menu. Indeed, the
fact that it may be optimal to oﬀer a variety of breadths is conﬁrmed in the model
with endogenous breadth through walls and patenting around.
Much existing workon optimal patent breadth deals with models of horizontal
diﬀerentiation. The model of sections 3 and 4 is one of vertical diﬀerentiation.
To see how the same concept of using menus of patent breadths applies to these
commonly discussed cases, section 5 shows how unobserved heterogeneity can
lead to the desirability of oﬀering a variety of patent breadths in the horizontal
diﬀerentiation model of Klemperer (1990). It is also noted that even if breadth
is constrained to take a single value, the optimal patent may diﬀer from the one
that Klemperer (1990) ﬁnds in the presence of complete information.
As a patent authority, setting breadth may be diﬃcult, in practice, due to the
wide variety of products that are patented under a single statute. This is an issue
in standard models of breadth such as Gilbert and Shapiro (199) and Klemperer
(1990), but is even more apparent when the optimal patent calls for a variety
of breadths being delineated. Overcoming this problem is the focus of section
6. Two approaches are considered. The ﬁrst is simply to explain how current
case law on patent infringement provides useful instruments for oﬀering diﬀering
patent breadth. Doctrines imposed by the courts and now a part of the eﬀective
law could be explicitly written in or out of the various types of patents oﬀered.
A second approach is to use fees paid by infringers to have the right to infringe.
Such an instrument is explored within the vertical diﬀerentiation model, and it is
4shown that appropriate fees paid by infringers can implement a speciﬁc breadth
of protection. Patents could be written with variable fees in order to provide
diﬀering degrees of breadth.
Section 7 attacks the issue of whether or not the problems raised in the theory
are relevant to patentees. First, we lookfor evidence of patent obsolescence in
the US patent data. The proposal of oﬀering diﬀerential breadth is most easily
justiﬁed when obsolescence is important, so socially desirable projects may not
value additional statutory patent length. We measure obsolescence by looking at
the eﬀect of citations. First we lookat patent renewal. We tak e recent ci tations
(2 years prior to renewal and sooner) as evidence of no obsolescence, and ﬁnd
that recent citations contribute positively to renewal after 12 years, suggesting
that some patents that are no longer cited have lost value. We compare claims
directed at a given patent to claims directed at a patent that cites the original
patent (indirect citation). Patents which are still being cited indirectly during
their statutory term often cease to be cited directly, evidence that improvements
can lead to patents losing their value.
Finally, anecdotal evidence is presented from interviews with practitioners
involved in making patenting and research decisions. They indicate that the sort
of problems that, according to the theory, may arise under a single patent breadth
are in fact a concern. They also conﬁrm that patentees seekadditional breadth
through patent walls.
2. The General Design Problem
Consider a patent authority faced with the following problem. An idea θ ∈ Θ
arrives randomly according to G(θ) to an innovator at time zero. Translating ideas
into inventions requires the inventor to combine his idea with a research cost c.
Innovators may always choose to pay a cost of zero and create an “innovation” of
zero value that cannot be distinguished from a valuable innovation by the patent
authority. The patent authority also does not observe θ.
Innovators can make proﬁts if and only if they are given a property right. This
property right has breadth B ∈ R per unit of time and lasts for T periods. The
innovator’s proﬁts are Π(B,T,θ).1 It is continuous as well as increasing in the
ﬁrst two arguments. Property rights (B and T) are essential if the innovator is to
make proﬁts: Π(0,T,θ)=Π ( B,0,θ)=0 . The authority may charge a fee F for
1Gilbert and Shapiro specialize to the case where proﬁts are
￿ T
0 π(B,θ).
5the property right. Notice that since zero value innovations are freely available
and indistinguishable from the rest, the government will never be able to oﬀer
direct monetary compensation to innovations.
Society beneﬁts from patents according to the continuous function S(B,T,θ),
which is decreasing in the ﬁrst two arguments to reﬂect the fact that market
power is costly to society. Notice that we do not include F in the social welfare
function. The assumption is that transfers from the producer to the government
are welfare neutral. In a sense, this is equivalent to assuming that the government
has access to a non-distortive tax instrument, a lump sum tax, and therefore there
is no social gain in transfers to the government. The reason for this assumption
is so that it is never eﬃcient for the government to “sell” patent power to raise
revenue. It is not hard to imagine better revenue raising instruments than patents;
for instance, a consumption tax drives a wedge between price and marginal cost
like monopoly power, but does not eﬀect future innovators. Assuming that there
is a better instrument than this sale of monopoly power is enough to maintain the
results.







IR :Π ( B ( θ ) ,T(θ),θ)−c−F(θ)≥0
IC :Π ( B ( θ ) ,T(θ),θ)−c−F(θ)≥Π(B(ˆ θ),T(ˆ θ),θ)−c−F(ˆ θ)∀ˆ θ
Moral Hazard : F(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ θ
The problem is formulated as an optimal revelation mechanism. The patent au-
thority sets a menu of patents, a breadth, length, and fee for each type θ. We will
assume that all useful innovations are worthy of being implemented; the ﬁrst con-
straint (individual rationality) says that the menu grants to each type suﬃcient
proﬁts to cover costs. The second constraint (incentive compatibility) ensures
that each type θ accurately “reports” their type by choosing the appropriate
menu item. The ﬁnal constraint, moral hazard, ensures that worthless innova-
tions are not patented. Since research costs are positive, some property rights
will be conveyed.
This formulation is similar to Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), who study a com-
plete information version of this form. Because of the complete information, there
is no need for fees. They use the special case Π(B,T)=
￿T
0 e − ρtπ(B)dt, where π
are instantaneous proﬁts as a function of B. The interpretation is that patents
6confer a constant reward, increasing in B, until the patent expires. The form used
here allows for the possibility that the patent may eﬀectively end before T due to
obsolescence of the product.
The use of renewal systems (a menu of fees and lengths) as a sorting mechanism
has been studied in recent workon patent design with incomplete information.
When breadth is added as an instrument, the optimal patent menu may involve
a variety of breadths. In fact, using fees may be inferior to breadth as a sorting
mechanism. Since patents reimburse ﬁxed costs, and since the patentee views the
fee as such a cost, charging a fee increases the costs that must be reimbursed with
socially costly market power.
Consider the case where the following sorting conditions hold:2
Sorting condition:
Π13(B,T,θ) > 0 > Π23(B,T,θ)
Π(B,T,θ) is monotonic in θ
The type space θ is taken to index projects by there proﬁtability, either up
or down. High θ types value breadth more and time less. This sorting condition
allows us to prove the following:3
Proposition 2.1. Let Θ={ 1 ,...,J}be a ﬁnite set of types. Under the sorting
conditions, there is an optimal patent menu (Bj,T j,F j)) where Fj =0for all j.
Sorting with breadth is better than with a fee because it does not inﬂate
the ﬁxed cost to be reimbursed. But what is the interpretation of the sorting
condition? In the following section we introduce a model consistent with the
conditions. The ﬂavor of the example is that the parameter θ indexes the degree
to which a product leads to subsequent products. patentees with high θ value
breadth because they are especially concerned about the possibility that future
ideas might eclipse the breadth of protection they have been conferred. On the
other hand, they value increments of time less because they are more likely to lose
their market power before T due to non-infringing competitors. Their eﬀective
patent length is likely to be limited by the early arrival of competitors outside of
their patent’s breadth.
Currently, there is a sort of patent menu: most patent systems, including,
now, the US, are renewal systems. The fees charged are a function of the length
of protection granted. There is no menu of breadths in the statute, however. In
2Subscripts denote derivatives or diﬀerences.
3The proof of the Propositions in this section is contained in an appendix.
7the notation here, one can describe the protection provided as being a menu of
patents (B,T(θ),F(θ)). Fees are positive for all θ. When the sorting condition
holds, Proposition 2.1 implies that this is not optimal. However, anytime breadth
is both costly (S strictly decreasing in B) and a viable instrument (Π strictly
increasing in B), it is never optimal to charge fees and maintain a constant breadth
across types.
Proposition 2.2. Let Θ be a countable set of types. If Π is strictly increasing
in B and S is strictly decreasing in B, then a patent of the form (B,T (θ),F(θ))
with F (θ) > 0 for all θ cannot be optimal.
Breadth is less costly than fees, since it allows time of protection to be reduced,
whereas using fees require time to be increased to make up for the innovator’s cost
of paying the fee. The patent authority should always use the breadth instrument
if it is available.
3. Breadth and Innovation Fertility: A Sequential Model
The model above takes as given the proﬁt function of the potential patentee, in
the spirit of workby Gilbert and Shapiro. Given the general results above, it is
useful to consider a more structural model, describing the patent problem with
preferences and technologies. We consider the case of an innovation which arrives
and then may be superseded, so that the patent’s eﬀective length (the time until
a non-infringing improvement drives the original innovator out of the market) is
diﬀerent from its statutory life.
3.1. Environment
Consider a vertically diﬀerentiated quality ladder. Before the ﬁrst innovation ar-
rives, a technology producing a good of quality normalized to 0 is freely available.
The marginal cost of production of all qualities will be taken to be zero, for sim-
plicity. The inventor arrives with an observable improvement π, which also has
an unobservable parameter θ, which we take to be uncorrelated with π. A second
innovation arrives according to a Poisson process with arrival parameter θ;t h a t
is, the higher is θ, the sooner is the expected arrival of the second innovation.
This is the sense in which high θ means that the ﬁrst patentee has developed a
technology that is fertile: it leads to improvements sooner.
8When the second innovation arrives, it’s quality improvement over π is given
by ∆, which is distributed according to a continuously diﬀerentiable cumulative
density F(∆). The patent authority is charged with designing a patent menu for
the ﬁrst innovator. The menu is, as above, B(θ),T(θ),F(θ), where B(θ) is the
breadth of the patent. The interpretation is that when the second innovation
arrives, it can be produced provided that it has ∆ >B ( θ ) . Tis the length of
time the protection is conferred; after that, any improvement can be produced,
and the patentee’s product can be freely produced by competitive ﬁrms, so that
proﬁts fall to zero after T. For simplicity, there are only these two ideas, and not
an inﬁnite series of improvements.
Next, we describe the static competition game. Both the patentee and the
second innovator simultaneously choose a price. The quality 0, which is freely
available, is sold at marginal cost, p =0 . There is a single representative consumer
who demands a single unit and has reduced preference
u(q,p)=q−p
where q is the quality of the good purchased and p is the price paid. When the
second innovation is not involved, the equilibrium has pπ = π and the patentee
earns π units of proﬁt. When the second innovation has arrived and is suﬃciently
diﬀerent to be allowed to produce, the equilibrium has pπ =0and p∆ =∆ .
Consumers are indiﬀerent between the two products; it is assumed that they
buy from the highest quality and so the patentee earns proﬁts 0 and the second
innovator earns proﬁts ∆.
In general, the Coase theorem suggests that it is eﬃcient to grant large patent
power if eﬃcient licensing agreements can be made. In this context, note that
if the second innovator can buy the ﬁrst patent at its value to the patentee, he
can always be assured of all the incremental proﬁt of his innovation by paying the
patentee all of the future monopoly proﬁt ﬂows. Since the monopoly pricing in this
problem leads the monopoly provider to extract all the consumer surplus from the
agent, the second innovator’s decisions are undistorted by large monopoly power
to the ﬁrst agent.
Because we seekto investigate the social costs of patent power as including
distortions to future innovators, we do not allow for such patent buy-out. In
particular, we assume that innovations ∆ <Bare not implemented until the
original patent expires due to bargaining power of the patentee. This means that
the cost of patent power has the eﬀect of slowing second-generation innovations.
On the other hand, there is no cost to the monopoly power a patent provides:
9given the setup, the patentee extracts all of the surplus from the consumer. We
investigate cases where this does not hold later, and conﬁrm that it is not crucial
to the results.
It is assumed that the second innovator has access to the same set of patents.
In principle one would oﬀer diﬀerent patents to the second innovator, but the
menu is maintained to keep things as simple as possible. The second innovator
simply chooses the patent with the maximum time, since breadth has no beneﬁt.
Note again that, given the speciﬁcation, there is no cost to granting a patent to
the second innovator.
3.2. Optimal Patent Design
We can now write this model in the form of the previous section by characterizing
Π and S. It turns out that the economy satisﬁes the sorting conditions, and thus
F =0in the optimal patent menu. This is interesting for two reasons: ﬁrst, it is
plausible that the optimal mechanism in reality should involve no fees (or perhaps
less prevalent fees), but rather a trade oﬀ of length for breadth. Second, it makes
the solution to the design problem simpler to characterize and more intuitive,
since it has only two instruments, eﬀectively. We then show circumstances under
which the menu is non-trivial, i.e. it is not only incentive feasible to trade B for
T in the optimal mechanism, but it is also optimal.
The patentee makes proﬁts π until a second innovation arrives and the innova-
tion is bigger than B, until the patent expires. Denote by P(t,θ) the probability
of an arrival of a second innovation in the ﬁrst tperiods for an innovation of type






− ρtπ[(1 − P(t,θ)) + P(t,θ)F(B)]dt (3.1)
Notice that
Π23(B,T,θ)=e
− ρTπ[−(1 − F(B))P2(T,θ)] < 0
since P2 > 0, higher θ implies more likely arrival.
The derivative of the integrand in (??) with respect to B is
e
−ρtπ[P(t,θ)f(B)]
where f is the pdf of F. Taking the derivative of that with respect to θ yields
e
−ρtπ[P2(t,θ)f(B)] > 0
10which implies the cross derivative d2
dBdθ of the integrand is positive. As a result,
Π13(B,T,θ) > 0. The problem simpliﬁes to the form of the previous section, from
which we conclude that optimal fees are zero.
The patent authority maximizes social gain, the sum of producer and consumer
surplus. Before the second innovation arrives, the patentee earns π and consumers
get zero utility. If an improvement has arrived but is less than B, the patentee
retains monopoly and nothing changes. When an idea arrives and either it is
greater than B or the patent has expired, it can be produced. It is sold at a price
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The cost of patents is that they lead to slower arrival of second generation inno-
vations. Society always enjoys π, either from proﬁts or consumer surplus. The
second term includes the incremental social gain from all arrivals up to time T
which are implemented. Until T they are only implemented if they exceed B,i n
which case they provide an expected social gain equal to the expectation of ∆
conditional on ∆ >B . This even has a probability of 1 − F(B), conditional on
arrival. The last term includes the fact that all arrivals are implemented one way
or another after T and generate incremental expected gain of the expectation of
∆ from then on.
One way to better understand the preferences of society is to calculate the
marginal disutility of each patent instrument. To calculate the derivative of S
with respect to B, rewrite E(∆|∆ >B )(1 −F(B)) in the second term of (??)a s




and compute the derivative S1(B,T,θ), with, again, f denoting the probability






The cost of breadth depends on the discounted probability of arrival and the value
B and probability f(B) of additional second generation products delayed. It is
11interesting to note that although high θ implies a high valuation of breadth, it also






Since P2 is positive, S is more sensitive to breadth as θ rises. Fertile areas give
rise to more second generation innovations, and so precluding them is more costly
to society. This force can tend to prevent society from oﬀering greater breadth to
more fertile inventions. Much of the remainder of this section will serve to show,
however, that it does not necessarily eliminate oﬀering greater breadth to high θ
inventions.








0 e − ρtdt+
E(∆|∆ >B )(1 − F(B))
￿ ∞
0 e−ρtP(t,θ)dt+
E(∆|∆ <B) F( B)
￿∞




so that it is straightforward to calculate the derivative of S with respect to T, S2,
as
S2(B,T,θ)=− F( B ) E (∆|∆ <B) e
− ρTP(T,θ) < 0
The cost of time depends on how many patents are eﬀected (F(B)), their value
(E(∆|∆ <B ) ), and the probability of arrival before T, P(T,θ). Granting addi-
tional time is increasingly costly in θ:
S23(B,T,θ)=− F( B ) E (∆|∆ <B ) e
− ρTP2(T,θ)<0
Notice that both B and T are more costly the higher is θ. Because of this, it is
possible to have non-trivial patent menus, in the sense that the optimal incentive
compatible menu does not set B and T the same for all θ. When society oﬀers
more breadth to a patentee, it can oﬀer less length and still oﬀer the same reward.
The cost to society of patents depends on the distribution of ∆ across the eﬀected
improvements ∆ <B ; the patentee only cares about the probability with which
B is exceeded.
The cost of patent power can be described by the function −S(B,T,θ) which
is minimized by the patent authority. The ﬁndings for the sequential model are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. The social cost of patents, −S(B,T,θ), are increasing in the
ﬁrst two arguments. The marginal cost of each patent instrument is increasing in
12θ. The marginal proﬁt value of B is increasing in θ and the marginal proﬁt value
of T is decreasing in θ.
3.3. An Example
To illustrate the role and optimality of non-trivial patent menus, consider a simple
case where F(∆) is a point mass on some ¯ ∆. There are two types of original




−ρtπ(1 − P(t,θ1))dt = c
for some ﬁnite T1. In this case, a T1 period patent of breadth 0 is suﬃcient to
induce investment for potential patentees θ1. The patent is simply conferring
the monopoly right to sell the project through T1. Improvements are free to
infringe. Since the price setting game implies that monopolists extract all of the
surplus from consumers, this sort of monopoly power has no social cost, that is,
it maximizes S() without constraint. It is straightforward to extend the model to
cases where monopoly rights have social cost and maintain the results here; one
such model is discussed below.
On the other hand, suppose that θ2 is very high, so that the return to an




−ρtπ(1 − P(t,θ2))dt < c
Without breadth, fertile ideas θ2 are not implemented, even if T2 = ∞.F o r
instance, if θ2 nears inﬁnity, discounted proﬁts are near zero since an improvement
arrives almost immediately. Fertile innovations require breadth.
This example illustrates the trade-oﬀ faced by the patent oﬃce. It is forced
to provide breadth B2 = ¯ ∆ to induce innovation in very valuable, high fertility
areas; however, this protection is very costly when ¯ ∆ is large, and so it is only
used when absolutely necessary to induce the original project. The length of the





Since P(t,θ1) ∈ (0,1),T 2<T 1 .The patent authority must provide (complete)
protection for the fertile innovation, but can provide it for a shorter interval.
13Notice that oﬀering this patent (¯ ∆,T 2)to the fertile type and the patent (0,T 1)
to the low type is incentive compatible: both give the low type θ1 the same reward,
and patentees of fertile inventions strictly prefer (¯ ∆,T 2). The patent authority,
then, can screen by oﬀering these two types of patents, and in fact ﬁnds it optimal
to do so. Fertile innovations get protection from future projects; infertile areas
get monopoly rights for a longer time interval, but no right to exclude signiﬁcant
improvements.
4. Patent Walls and “Designing Around”
The discussion so far has focused on the normative: how should patents diﬀer
when inventions diﬀer? The patent statute, however, does not provide for this
in practice. How do innovators respond? One common story is that patentees
can acquire breadth by taking an initial innovation and build a “patent wall”
by patenting many similar products. The rationale is that holding many patents
makes it more likely that any improvement on the true innovation will be found
to infringe some part of the wall. The sequential model is well suited to analyzing
the way innovators respond to the possibility of patent walls.
The other end of patent walls is what is called “designing around.” Designing
around is the idea that a substitute or improvement, which would be found to
infringe, is suitably modiﬁed for the sole purpose of avoiding infringement of
existing patents. Walls may discourage this behavior by making it more diﬃcult
and hence costly to redesign second generation products.
Both of these behaviors are relevant to the normative issues raised. To the
extent that patent law does not adequately provide breadth to the most fertile
innovations, it may lead to ineﬃciencies in the wasteful spending of research re-
sources in designing other parts of the wall, even when they have no incremental
value of their own. At the same time, designing around can be seen as a wasteful
activity, also wasting research resources.
4.1. A Model of Walls and Designing Around
Walls and designing around are incorporated into the sequential model as a simple,
reduced form addition to the model. Suppose that the ﬁrst innovator, upon
realizing θ, can choose not only whether or not to spend c, but also to spend some
additional resources w to build a wall. When an improvement arrives, second
generation innovators can spend resources a designing around the initial patent.
14Given a statutory breadth B, an improvement ∆ infringes if ∆ <B+Ω(w)−K(a),
where both Ω and K are increasing, concave, and equal zero when evaluated at
zero. Patent breadth is costly to acquire, and the marginal cost is also increasing.
The interpretation is that it may not be diﬃcult to invent a few “reinventions”
that are patentable and help the patentee defend the innovation, but it becomes
increasingly diﬃcult to develop non-inventions that will be helpful in defending
the patent. Likewise, the cost of patenting around is increasing in the amount
done, and is also increasingly costly at the margin: it is very diﬃcult to patent
around when ∆ is far from B +Ω ( w ) .
Working backwards, given an eﬀective breadth of protection B +Ω ( w ) ,t h e
second generation innovator must design around for any improvement ∆ <B+
Ω(w) in the amount ¯ a(B +Ω ( w)) which solves
K(¯ a)=B+Ω ( w )−∆
For an arrival at time t, this is preferable to waiting for the original patent to
expire if ￿ maxT
0
e





or, if ∆ exceeds
∆L(B +Ω ( w ) ,t)=





The solution to the patenting around problem, then, is
a
∗(B +Ω ( w ) ,t)=
￿
¯ aif ∆ ∈ (∆L(B +Ω ( w ) ,t),B+Ω ( w ))
0 otherwise
Very small improvements are not worth the expense of patenting around. Large
improvements are noninfringing on their own.






−ρtπ[(1 − P(t,θ)) + P(t,θ)F(∆L(B +Ω ( w) ,t))]dt −w
Now the patentee ceases to make monopoly proﬁts if the improvement is at least
∆L, in which case the second product is developed through patenting around.
There are a variety of simple regularities about the process of patenting around
and developing patent walls which are useful.
15Proposition 4.1. The cutoﬀ project implemented, ∆L(·,t),is increasing in the
ﬁrst argument.
This is simply a consequence of the fact that the higher is the eﬀective breadth,
the higher is the cost of designing around, and hence the larger is the improvement
required to motivate the undertaking. The more eﬀective breadth the patent has
(deﬁned by B +Ω ( w ) ), the more of an improvement the second innovator needs
to ﬁnd it worthwhile to develop and patent around (if necessary). Since eﬀective
breadth is less costly at the margin when B is higher, the patentee acquires more
eﬀective protection when B is higher.
Proposition 4.2. The eﬀective protection obtained by the patentee B+Ω(w∗(B))
is increasing in B. Also, the optimal patent wall w∗ an hence the eﬀective protec-
tion is increasing in θ and π.
Since Ω is concave, the marginal cost of additional eﬀective breadth is de-
creasing in B for any B +Ω ( w ) , and the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀective breadth is
independent of breadth, so therefore more is acquired the higher is breadth. On
the other hand, the marginal beneﬁt of additional eﬀective breadth is increasing
in θ and π; concavity implies the marginal cost of breadth is increasing. Opti-
mality of w requires that marginal cost equals marginal beneﬁt, and so increasing
in θ and π The eﬀect of B on w∗ is ambiguous, and depends on, among other
things, F(∆). The latter part of the proposition presents a straightforward but
useful comparative static: more proﬁtable (per period) projects and ones more
susceptible to obsolescence are the ones where walls are the biggest.
4.2. Normative Implications
Patent menus can have another role in this environment. Patent walls and de-
signing around are accomplished by resources better used, in the eyes of society,
elsewhere, if incentives could be designed properly. It is straightforward to calcu-
late, as in the case without walls or patenting around, that the sorting conditions
hold, and therefore the optimal fees are zero.4
Proposition 4.3. Π13 > 0, Π23 < 0.
4The only fact to remember is that both eﬀective breadth and, therefore, the cutoﬀ project
implemented are increasing in the relevant arguments, as discussed above.
16Once again, if it is useful to oﬀer diﬀering patents do diﬀerent projects, then
sorting should be done without fees. In addition to the reasons before, menus can
serve to provide protection that would have been acquired at social cost.
5. Other Monopoly Costs of Patents
So far, the monopoly cost that has been the focus is the fact that patents may
preclude second-generation innovations. The use of patent menus is not limited
to these cases. Other, perhaps more conventional costs of monopoly can also
be considered, and patent menus can be optimal in those cases as well. Such a
possibility is demonstrated using a standard horizontal-diﬀerentiation model of
patent breadth.
Consider the model used by Klemperer (1990). It is a Hotelling-style model,
with a continuum of goods. There is a unit mass of consumers for the patented
good. Each has a reservation price ¯ p and a cost of substitution τ per unit in the
product space away in from the patented good. Each consumer chooses to con-
sumer one unit or none. They may consume either the patented good, which has
price p, or a competitively produced substitute B units away, priced at marginal
cost m, and so has eﬀective price m + τB.
In the sequential innovations model, θ indexed the speed of new arrivals. Here
θ will eﬀect the cost of the competitor. Suppose that none of the products are
possible before the arrival of the potentially patented invention. After the arrival,
if the innovator chooses to invest c, the good which is invented can be produced at
cost zero and the rest of the goods can be produced at a cost m(θ). Let m(θ) be
a decreasing function, so that high θ indicates low cost substitutes are available.
Inventions with high θ are more ﬂexible, in the sense that they lower costs by a
greater amount to other possible products. This is similar to the role of θ before:
higher θ means more competition faces the patentee.
Consider the case (considered by Klemperer) where τ is homogeneous across
consumers and ¯ p is heterogeneous, distributed according to D(p). The cost of
patent breadth, in this case, is that the patentee may price some consumers out
of the market in order to extract surplus from consumers with more willingness
to pay. Klemperer shows that, with complete information by the patent oﬃce,
it is optimal to provide a long-lived patent of as narrow a breadth as possible
to reimburse c, if c is small enough. With incomplete information about some
characteristics of the patented good, thought, this may not be true.
An alternative way to view τ when it is homogeneous is as a per-unit cost
17of producing a competing good, similar to the concept of designing around. The
idea is that a competitor must spend resources to modify the good sold in order
that it does not infringe. It is natural to thinkof breadth as increasing this cost
for potential competitors.
In a given period, the patentee solves
π(B,θ)= m a x
p ∈ [0,m(θ)+τB]
pD(p)
The patentee must price below m(θ)+τB; otherwise, no one buys the patented
good, they all either substitute or do not consume.






To the patentee, competitors constrain the set of feasible prices.
5.1. What if only one patent is oﬀered?
One point to emphasize is that even if one restricts the patent authority to oﬀer a
single type of patent, that patent is not necessarily inﬁnitely lived, in contrast with
Klemperer’s result. The reason is that here, unlike with complete information,
the amount of proﬁts is (except for the highest type, who will be on the IR
constraint) endogenous. By oﬀering a broader but more short-lived patent, society
loses relative to a long lived patent which oﬀers the same proﬁts, but gains to
the extent that it allows the patent authority to deliver less monopoly proﬁts to
some types. This is because not every individual is being reimbursed the costs of
research; many are rebated more, due to rents from their private information.5
Proposition 5.1. Consider the horizontal-diﬀerentiation model, and let c be suf-
ﬁciently small and only one type of patent (B,T) is oﬀered. It is not necessarily
true that the optimal patent has T = ∞.
More generally than simply in this model, unobserved heterogeneity impacts
the optimal patent. This is something to keep in mind anytime patent length and
breadth are chosen.
5Once again, the proofs of results in this section are contained in an appendix.
185.2. Patent Menus
Anytime the constraint binds for type θ and a given B, it also binds for a type
θ
￿ >θ . Clearly, then, π2 < 0, and so Π23 = π3(B,θ)e−ρT < 0. The value of B is
the shadow value of increasing the constraint at the rate τ. If the constraint does
not bind, B has no marginal value to the patent holder. To calculate Π13, note
the ﬁrst order condition from the patentees problem when the constraint binds
D(p)+pd(p)=λ
The Lagrange multiplier λ is the value of relaxing the constraint, and d(p) is the
pdf of D. Since p = m(θ)+τB at the constraint, taking the cross derivative of λ





where primes denote derivatives. This is positive if the last term is negative, under
which Π13 > 0.
Under some restriction, then, the sorting condition apply. That is not, how-
ever, evidence that it is societally preferable to oﬀer a variety of patents. Nonethe-
less, it can be. Consider a case with a ﬁnite number of types, where c is small,
and where the sorting conditions hold. The question is whether the patent oﬃce
wants to oﬀer two types of patents, or just one. For instance, consider a case
(proven to exist by the previous proposition), where an inﬁnitely lived patent is
not optimal if only one patent is oﬀered. Begin with some patent ( ¯ B, ¯ T), oﬀered
to all types. Consider, for the type with the lowest θ, denoted θL (i.e. the least
ﬂexible invention, the one with the least competition and the most proﬁtability),
oﬀering a patent with inﬁnite length that provides the same proﬁts as alternative









Under the sorting condition, this is incentive compatible, since replacing B with
T is most desirable for θL. But by Klemperer’s proposition 2, conditional on a
given reward, it is optimal to oﬀer T as high as possible, and so oﬀering the menu
is beneﬁcial.
This section, then, establishes two points: ﬁrst, even without a menu of
patents, the existence of heterogeneity eﬀects optimal patent policy relative to
19cases considered in other workon optimal patent breadth. Second, patent menus
may be optimal for sorting among projects with diﬀering degrees of “ﬂexibility”
to other horizontally-diﬀerentiated products.
6. Implementing Patent Breadth
Patent breadth is an inherently vague concept, in practice. The policy proposal of
oﬀering multiple patent breadths may seem, in light of this vagueness, particularly
diﬃculty. Here we address that issue by discussing operational ways to implement
B. The ﬁrst set of these pertains to employing the many ways patent breadth
is currently deﬁned. Another perhaps more novel approach is to consider the
possibility of allowing infringement in exchange for a predetermined buyout fee.
The impact of buyout fees is examined within the frameworkof the sequential
model introduced earlier.
6.1. Currently Available Breadth Instruments
The patent statute is relatively vague in its deﬁnition of what a patent protects
against. Taken at its most literally, a patent is a set of claims, listed at the ap-
plication date, which deﬁne the innovation. The actual scope of the protection
extends beyond these claims, however, for an obvious reason: noninfringing im-
provements are meant to be substantively diﬀerent from the patented innovation,
not just descriptively diﬀerent. As a result, the case law and the treatment by the
patent oﬃce has included a variety of extra protections upheld by the courts.6
6.1.1. What can be claimed?
One crucial element of patent breadth is the speciﬁcity of the claim. Patent law
states that all claims must disclose enough information for “any person skilled
in the art to make and use” the innovation. In fact, recent Patent Oﬃce rulings
have extended patent scope. One example is the case of Genentech.7 Scientists
produced two human proteins using a given process. The process was not new,
but the scientists were the ﬁrst to use it to produce human proteins. Genentech
claimed rights to the principle of using this method to generate human proteins.
They were allowed to, in essence, patent the principle.
6For a more complete description of the patent law doctrine, see Merges and Nelson (1994).
7Once again, see Merges and Nelson (1994) for a more detailed account.
206.1.2. The Doctrine of Equivalents
Given a set of claims, the breadth of protection is not necessarily limited to the
claims themselves. In the famous Graver Tank case, the supreme court held that
explicit infringement of a claim was not required to ﬁnd infringement, that it was
suﬃcient for the infringing innovation to “workin substantially the same way,
and accomplish the same result.” This Doctrine of Equivalents has a range of
applications. One recent case where the Supreme Court upheld the Doctrine,
Warner Jenkinson Company, Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., illustrates its
role. The case involved procedures for ultraﬁltration of dyes. Before an innovation
by Hilton Davis, the ﬁltration required pH levels higher than nine. Hilton Davis
introduced a method that, according to the claim of their patent, would operate
at pH levels between six and nine.8 Warner Jenkinson ﬁled for a patent a year
later, claiming a technique suitable for a pH of ﬁve. Hilton Davis claimed that
their patent should extend as low as ﬁve by the Doctrine of Equivalents, despite
the fact that (pH is a logarithmic scale) their claimed process was ten times as
basic as the Hilton Davis procedure.
6.1.3. When are claims made?
In some cases, not all the capabilities of a product are known at the time of
the discovery, and so some are left out of the patent’s claims. However, when
suing for infringement, a patentee can claim infringements on grounds that all
of the capabilities of the infringing discovery could have been accomplished by
the original patented product. For instance, one of the arguments used by Hilton
Davis was that despite the claim of pH levels from six to nine, their process could
have succeeded at a pH of 5. Given the current law, it is legitimate to make these
kinds of ex-post claims in a patent infringement case.
6.1.4. Incorporation of these doctrines
In its recent ruling in the Warner Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis case, the Supreme
Court speciﬁcally stated that “Congress can legislate the doctrine of equivalents
out of existence at any time it chooses.” Although the doctrine may not have
been well deﬁned at the time of the writing of the original patent statute, it is
8Interestingly, Hilton Davis originally ﬁled for a patent where the claim simply said that
their process worked for pH’s less than nine. The patent examiner required that the claim be
made more speciﬁc.
21now an element of the law which can be deﬁned. As a result, it would be possible
to write a patent law with a menu of choices including allowing the patentee to
decide whether or not to commit to having Doctrine of Equivalents protection,
perhaps at the cost of a shorter patent length.
Other changes and evolutions of patent law could be laid out in a patent
statute that allowed for multiple types of patents. Can a patentee reserve the
right to add future claims, if they are discovered to be possible under the original
invention? Can the “principle” of the invention be patented, or only the speciﬁc
accomplishments? In each case, the inclusion of the protection as an option on
the patent menu would be clearly deﬁnable.
A menu of patents is not novel in the US, in a sense. The US has incorporated
renewal fees, so that patent of diﬀerent lengths have diﬀerent fees. The fees,
however, are quite small. In terms of breadth, the US does have one sort of
patent menu. Asexually reproduced plants may be patented under either of two
diﬀerent patents. First is the standard utility patent. Second is a plant patent,
which provides protection if and only if the infringer is grafted from a patented
plant.9 The function or structure of the plant is irrelevant under a plant patent,
unlike a common utility patent, meaning a diﬀerent set of subsequent plants is
protected.
6.2. Buyout Fees
Given that the discussion above only focuses on a few ways to deﬁne breadth, and
since the optimal patent menu may involve patent breadths not achievable with
existing deﬁnitions of breadth, another way in which breadth can be implemented
is useful. If improvements must pay a fee for each infringement, regardless of
the level of improvement, small improvements may be avoidable due to the small
gain they oﬀer an infringing innovator. These fees are termed “buyout” fees, to
distinguish them from the F introduced above.
In practice, the court system is used to determine infringement. One way
to thinkof this process is in the language of the sequential model: the courts
determine if ∆ is greater than B. Because this process is so uncertain, it seems
reasonable to assume that not only θ but also ∆ may be unobserved. Another
way to say this is that it may be diﬃcult, given that patents are arbitrated in
court and come in many sorts, to clearly deﬁne B in the statute. We will assume
9>From the Franklin Pierce Law Center web page,
http://www.fplc.edu/TFIELD/plﬁp/plﬁpCom.htm.
22that by the time that the second innovation arrives, π is observable, but θ and ∆
are not. The history of the patented good, then, is suﬃcient to know it’s value,
but the new product does not have the same record.
6.2.1. Fees Paid to the Government
Instead of deﬁning a patent breadth, the government policy can take the form of
a fee charged to the second innovator, paid to the government, in exchange for
freedom from the initial patent. A patentee who chooses a high fee is implicitly
choosing a broad patent, since only large ∆ projects will be suﬃciently proﬁtable
to make paying the fee worthwhile for the second innovator.
Denote the buyout fee by φt(B), and deﬁne it by
φt(B)=( 1−e





The buyout fee φ is exactly equal to the gain in gross proﬁts from immediate pro-
duction of an innovator with improvement B, who chooses in this model simply
the maximum time of protection. Since proﬁts are increasing in ∆, it is straight-
forward to see that only projects ∆ >Bare implemented, since only then is it
worthwhile to pay the fee.
Implicitly, this patenting problem has had at its heart an ineﬃciency in the
transactions made between the ﬁrst and second innovator. Because of this, some
useful projects are delayed by patent protection. The essence of the buyout system
is that, in such a circumstance, the fee serves as a sort of pre-committed contract,
where the initial patentee is forced to “sell” the patent right for φ. This deﬁnition
of B makes it straightforward to implement breadth versus length patent menus
which are often optimal. Since the original patent still runs until an improvement
of B is reached, the proﬁt function for the innovator is unchanged and the sorting
conditions hold. Moreover, S is unchanged, so all of the normative implications
remain. Menus of breadth and length, in this case in the form (φ(B(θ)),T(θ)),
may be useful.
The buyout fee is a diﬀerent fee from the one (F) described in the earlier
section. Intuitively, though, the ﬁrst proposition of the paper pointed out that if
government revenue is better raised through sources other than monopoly power,
it is preferable to ﬁnd patent instruments other than fees. One natural alternative
is to have φ paid to the ﬁrst innovator as a reward for the useful product.
A patent policy based on a mandated buyout fee is a sort of pre-commit licens-
ing agreement, which can be valuable when ex post licensing leads to ineﬃciency.
23Buyout fees might be used in themselves as a simple-to-deﬁne breadth instrument,
or in conjunction with the deﬁnitions of breadth discussed previously in order to
provide a variety of well deﬁned patent breadths to choose from
7. Evidence on Obsolescence
The policy recommendation above, to sort across diﬀerent products using diﬀer-
ent patent breadth, applies to the case where diﬀerent innovations have diﬀerent
spillovers to other products, in terms of making improvements come along sooner.
Especially useful innovations may require a great about of breadth that is not
optimal to provide to other projects. The crucial feature is that more socially
desirable patents may be less proﬁtable due to their value as building blocks to
future innovations.
7.1. Evidence from US Patent Data
The sample used for this analysis consists of all utility patents that were granted
in 1983. The citation history of these patents was constructed taking all citations
up to 1995. The choice of sample was motivated by two factors: 1) To have long
citation histories; 2) Including patents for which renewal fees, instituted at the
end of 1979, apply. The number of patents in this set is approximately 54,000,
generating as of 1995 almost 315,000 citations, approximately 5.7 cites per patent.
One feature of the model above is that some projects are made obsolete be-
fore their patent term expires. This is what leads some ﬁrms, predicting rapid
improvements leading to obsolescence, to prefer broader patent protection. Using
US patent data, we ﬁnd evidence that obsolescence is important. Since the patent
data provides no direct evidence on value, we take the common stance of using
patent renewals as a measure of value.10 To measure obsolescence, we use patent
citations. We view recent citations to a patent as evidence that the patent is still
relevant, and hence generating value. We perform the following experiment. We
regress, as a logit model of probability of renewal, the eﬀect of both total cita-
tions and recent citations (citations made within 2 years of the renewal date). We
include total citations since the current literature has shown (Trajtenberg (1990))
that citations are a positive predictor of a patents value. We also include num-
ber of claims in the patent as a way of holding the breadth of the patent ﬁxed;
10For instance, Pakes and Schankerman (1986) and Pakes (1986) use renewaldata from Eu-
ropean patents to estimate patent value.
24however, claims are never signiﬁcant. For the renewal after 4 and 8 years, we ﬁnd
that recent citations has a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on renewal. We take
this as evidence that most patents have at least a few years of eﬀective life. At
the 12 year renewal, however, we ﬁnd that not only are total citations signiﬁcant
contributors to the probability of renewal, but that recent citations also predict












INTERCEPT 0.6371 0.0193 1086.5391 0.0001
CLAIMS 0.00194 0.00128 2.3228 0.1275 0.009927 1.002
CITE12 0.0313 0.00263 141.6545 0.0001 0.121063 1.032
CITE10_12 0.0342 0.0106 10.4540 0.0012 0.033266 1.035
The odds ratio gives the additional probability of renewal for an increment to
the variable; that is, a citation in the ﬁrst 12 years increases the probability of
renewal by 3.2%, but one in the two years prior has an additional 3.5% increase
in the probability of renewal. Recent renewals are almost twice as important as
other renewals.
We also explore the protection a patent provides as its statutory term proceeds.
Citations are decomposed in the following way. Consider a patent p. Let D(p)
denote the set of all patents that cite p during our sample period. We use the
letter D to denote direct citations. Let I(p)=D(D(p)), denote indirect or second
round citations for this patent. This set consists of all patents that cite any patent
that directly cites p. Finally, let C(p)=I(p) U D(p) denote the set of direct and
indirect citations for this patent. The following statistics were computed with a
5% random sample of the population of all utility patents granted in 1983 with
between 10 and 25 total citations by 1995. This selection is made to focus on
“successful” patents which generated a signiﬁcant number of citations.
Figure 1 gives a frequency distribution of the ratio of direct to total citations.
Higher values for this statistic reﬂect a patent that is not “forgotten” easily.
Indeed, if all citations to downstream patents cited the upstream ones too, then
the ratio would be one.
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The mode and median are at around 10%, and there is quite a large variation.
This low number may thus reﬂect that patents in C(p) do indeed substitute the
original patent, receiving with exclusivity most of the new citations.. Notice that
the patents we consider are fairly successful ones, as we restrict our sample to
those that have between 10 and 25 citations.
Figure 2 provides a frequency decomposition of direct citations by exclusivity.
For a given patent p we say patent q in C(p) is an exclusive citation if it does not
cite other patents that directly cite p. Thus, the set of exclusive cites of p are all
those patents in C(p) that do not belong to C(C(p)). A low value of C(p) could
be interpreted as conferring more ambiguous property rights, since in that case
a large proportion of those patents that cite the original one also cite one in its
downstream.
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%
The median and the mode are around 60%, indicating a relatively high degree
of non-competing citations, or lackof complementarity.
Figure 3 gives a frequency distribution of the median citation year for a subset
of patents. This frequency distribution is based on all utility patents granted in
1983 that had from 10 to 25 citations in the period 1983-95, almost 8,000 patents.
For each patent, we computed the median citation lag. The ﬁgure provides a
frequency distribution of these medians. It is important to notice that due to the
existence of an end period, there is right truncation at 14 years. This certainly
contributes to the decrease in citation frequencies exhibited after year 6.
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This ﬁgure shows, quite strikingly, the existing dispersion in patent diﬀusion
curves, as measured by citations. It also suggests that citation lags tend to be
concentrated around 6 years
The summary statistics presented here, though quite preliminary and rudimen-
tary, suggest that the design issues considered in this paper can be of considerable
signiﬁcance. One potential problem is that some highly useful, fast to obsolete
projects may not be undertaken given the current patent oﬀered in the US. To
understand this part of the role of patents , we discussed the innovation process
with some practitioners in research and development who make patenting and
investment decisions.
7.2. How do innovators react to current policy?
In order to get a better handle on the way current policy impacts research and
development, we interviewed several people involved in various areas of research.
Fundamentally, the issue presented here is the question of whether socially more
valuable projects may be privately less valuable when proﬁts are eroded from
socially beneﬁcial future innovations, and whether current policy leads to the fail-
ure of researchers to invest in these projects. In total, we talked with individuals
at large corporations such as Kodak, Xerox and Corning, as well as a research
chemist at Aspen Research, a contract research company.
28It was clear from our discussions that the availability of protection does eﬀect
the projects ﬁrms undertake. One interesting case of this came from talking to
a contract research ﬁrm. The ﬁrm does a variety of problem-solving research
for a variety of clients, including developing eﬃcient quality control standards
and analysis of product failures. Often, this research leads their scientists to
contemplate patentable innovations, often with broader application, which might
be especially useful to the client, but not part of the client’s original order. Their
procedure often, then involves contacting the client and discussing whether or not
further research on the idea is something that the client would like to fund. In
some ways, this is the story of an idea, the intrinsic value of which seems high,
which requires funding. In conversation with this ﬁrm we asked what happens
after that. The response was interesting. They said that their procedure is to
approach the ﬁrm about funding the project. The agreement typically involves
all or some of the rights to the patent to the client funding the project. They said
that it was not uncommon for the client to agree with the scientists about the
potential usefulness of the invention, but for the invention not to go forward due
to problems with limited ability to protect the patent from innovators.
Another manager listed their criterion for patenting. Number one, of course,
was value to the ﬁrm; number two was potential value to outsiders. This ﬁrm is
very concerned with the negative consequences to its own market position of future
inventions made by competitors using the knowledge embodied in the original
patent. In some cases, an answer may be found in avoiding patents in favor of trade
secrecy; sometimes, though, when the ﬁnal product is easily reverse engineered,
even this road is not possible. Trade secrecy can have cost, naturally, associated
with limiting the transmission of information, with complete avoidance being an
even more societally costly alternative.
A similar story was told by a manager in a large company with its own re-
search laboratory. In their case, ideas ﬂow to researchers in the laboratory, who
then pitch the ideas to a set of people charged with developing the corporation’s
strategy toward the innovation. The researcher is primarily charged with coming
up with the most useful inventions possible. Then the innovation is evaluated for
proﬁt potential. When asked about the latter part, it seemed clear that current
patent breadth can lead to the avoidance of certain projects. In particular, the
manager discussed a particular rival who has taken up the strategy of eliminating
research and imitating their developments. The presence of this rival, in particu-
lar, means that some innovations that seem to have the potential for signiﬁcant
value end up receiving no support when they are vulnerable to encroachment by
29the imitator.
Interestingly, it was pointed out that the research cost c should sometimes
be interpreted broadly. In cases where it is determined that the patent protec-
tion will not make a project proﬁtable, often the project is already to a stage of
patent readiness. The question is whether or not to pay the substantial costs of
“commercialization,” (a term of a practitioner for the investment made at this
point), knowing that much of that cost generates beneﬁts for both the ﬁrm and
its competitors. A patent is unlikely to lead to anyone producing without the
commercialization costs being paid, but paying the commercialization costs may
not be worthwhile if the patent is not broad enough, to the extent that these
investments beneﬁt all potential market participants.
The notion that some innovations would gladly trade broader protection for
less time protected was well received; it seemed, as well, that the sorts of projects
for which this would be most welcome are, naturally, the ones where the inherent
value seems high but the appropriable proﬁts are low.
That innovators respond to current policy by building walls is not a novel
ﬁnding, but it was conﬁrmed here. It was, in virtually all cases, the practice of
the company to develop a patent strategy toward an innovation that frequently
involved resources to be spent on other patents whose primary purpose is to
defend the initial one. “Broadly applicable” ideas are the ones where this is
most common, according to practitioners; the company holds oﬀ on the initial
patent until it has a clear patent for many of the foreseeable applications. This is
evidence that ﬁrms are not able to appropriate their value as building blocks to
future patents which incorporate their ideas. Instead, they workto patent many
possible applications rather than delegate these tasks to the most productive ﬁrm.
In addition, delay of the initial patent has natural costs of delayed information
transmission, as well.
This is related to the idea of being able to patent a “concept” as discussed in
the section on patent law above. Such broad protection can be dangerous, but in
many areas, such as some of the inventions we discussed with the practitioners,
it may be necessary. This paper suggests one way to deal with this is to provide
such protection only for a few years.
8. Summary
Patents reward innovators, but at a cost to society. In addition to the common
monopoly pricing ineﬃciencies, patent breadth may retard the innovative activity
30it was meant to promote through the power it provides to initial innovators.
To the extent to which diﬀerent innovations provide diﬀerent contributions to
future research, a “one size ﬁts all” patent policy is inappropriate. It may not
provide suﬃcient protection to very valuable inventions which lead readily to
second generation products. They may provide the wrong sort of protection to
various innovations. This intuition is true in a wide variety of cases, including both
vertical and horizontal competition, as well as cases where extra patent protection
can be acquired by innovators and destroyed by competitors at a cost.
In some cases, the optimal response to this heterogeneity is to provide a menu
of patent alternatives. This can be accomplished even when the patent authority
has no information about the characteristics of patent applicants, and therefore
must rely on a revelation of types by the patentees. To the extent that breadth
can be used as an instrument, it is preferable to sorting with a patent fee. In
almost all cases, it should be used as part of the menu. There are a variety of
ways to deﬁne patent breadth, using an explicit menu that combines the case
law established for deciding patent infringement cases and buyout fees paid by
infringers.
There is some anecdotal that the heterogeneity of projects forces innovators to
consider exactly the sort of questions the theory suggests a single type of patent
protection raises. Some ideas are simply too useful to competitors to be worth
the substantial costs of research. The proﬁtability of a project given a type of
protection is not necessarily increasing in the total value of the project.
US patent data provides evidence that patents are often superseded and their
value lost prior to the end of their statutory terms. This is consistent with the
model presented, which leads to the value of considering a policy of oﬀering mul-
tiple patent breadths. Understanding the heterogeneity in patent fertility is an
important question if such a policy is to be considered further.
A ﬁnal point is that unobservable heterogeneity can eﬀect optimal patents
even when one restricts attention to oﬀering a single patent type. A patent which
is optimal for a high proﬁt invention may not be suﬃcient encouragement for low
proﬁt inventions; on the other hand, encouraging low proﬁt innovations can be
detrimental when that same patent is owned by a higher proﬁt innovation. It may
be misleading to design a patent for one type of innovation in isolation without
considering the multitude of diﬀerent innovations which will be protected by that
same patent policy. At a minimum, this sort of heterogeneity should be considered
when designing patents. One potential way to deal with this issue is to use a menu
of patent breadths to sort diﬀerent types of innovations; more research into the
31potential gains from such a policy seem worthwhile.
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32A. Proofs
Proposition 2.1
Lemma A.1. Let {bj,t j,F j}
J
j=1 be an optimal patent system. If Fj > 0, there
must exist k<jand l>jsuch that the k,j and l,j constraints bind. Further-
more, F1 = FJ =0 .
Proof. Suppose that Fj > 0 and that no constraint k,j for k<jbinds. Then
consider the following alternative patent for type j : reduce bj and Fj in such a
way that the utility of type j remains unchanged. For all types greater than j
this represents a decrease in the utility associated to the j-patent. Furthermore,
provided the changes are small, all incentive constraints for types lower than j will
be satisﬁed. Since breadth is decreased for type j without changing patent length,
the patent system thus obtained is superior, contradicting the optimality of the
original one. The same procedure can be applied, but reducing patent length
instead, if no constraint k,j for k>jbinds. Finally, note that the argument
applied implies immediately that for the extreme types 1 and J, patent fees must
be zero.
Lemma A.2. Let {bj,t j,F j}
J
j=1 be an optimal patent system. Let J>j>1
and suppose Fj > 0. If for type j the constraint (j,k) binds, then (bk,t k)≥(b j,t j)
and Fk > 0.
Proof. Assume (j,k) binds. There are three possiblities: either (bk,t k) ≥
(b j,t j), (b j,t j)￿ (b k,t k) or the two vectors are not ordered. If the two vectors
are not ordered, then if j>k( j<k )all types l<j( l>j )must strictly prefer
the k-patent (l-patent) to the j-patent, so by lemma ?? Fj cannot be positive.
Second, notice that (bj,t j) ￿ (b k,t k) would contradict optimality, for in such
case the j type should be oﬀered the k-patent. Consequently, (bk,t k)≥(b j,t j),
and it must then be the case that Fk ≥ Fj > 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proof. For any j =1 ,...,J, let B (j) be the set of patent contracts to which j
binds. Let A be the set of types that are oﬀered patents with strictly positive
fees. Suppose A ￿= φ. By lemma ??, B (A) ⊂ A. But this implies that there is an
incentive compatible patent menu where all fees in A can be reduced. Such patent
menu could never be worse than the given one and by an appropriate reduction
in breadth or length is potentially better.
33Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. Denote the uniform patent by (B,T,F). Consider the type for which
Π1 is minimized, and call it ¯ θ. For that type, oﬀer an alternate patent (B￿,T,0),
where Π(B,T,¯ θ)−F =Π ( B ￿,T,¯ θ),s oB ￿<B . This patent is not desirable for
any other type by the selection of ¯ θ, and hence is IC, and changes no ones payoﬀ,
and hence is IR. But since B￿ <B , it oﬀers higher social value for the case of ¯ θ,
and is hence preferable to society.
Proof or Proposition 5.1
Proof. Consider the case where there are two types, θL and θH. If the government







if it is to encourage θH. For suﬃciently high m(θL),t h i sBimplies that the con-
straint p ≤ m(θ)+τB does not bind, i.e. the type θH patentee enjoys monopoly
power forever under the proposed patent. If c is small enough, the costs associ-
ated with any patent (B,T) which reimburses exactly c is small, yet the costs of
monopoly power for θH forever are not. Reducing the length of time for which
θH’s monopoly lasts, together with increasing B to satisfy the IR constraint of
θL is always welfare improving.
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